



Gaining the Edge

Shaping the Future

Brett van Niekerk Petrus "Beer" Duvenage



MISCONCEPTIONS

- Myth #1: Cyber intelligence is only about threat feeds
- Myth #2: Cyber intelligence is only about the consumption of information
- Myth #3: Cyber intelligence is cyber espionage
- Myth #4: You need to get the security basics right first

SO THEN WHAT IS CYBER INTELLIGENCE?

Cyber Intelligence

Cyber threat intel feeds

Government sources, CSIRT

Vendor alerts

Cyber counterintelligence

Internal e.g. logs, SIEM etc

Other sources

SO THEN WHAT IS CYBER INTELLIGENCE?

- Cyber Intelligence is about analysis, not the source of data
 - Examples:
 - Human Intelligence (HUMINT) human source
 - Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) signal source
 - Source is important, but does not define it
 - Needs to be actionable
 - Refer to Myths #1 & #2

LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE

	Strategic	gic Operationa		Tactical
Scope	General	Industry sector		Company - internal
Focus	Political, social, behavioral	Adversary campaigns		In the network
Audience	C-level	Executive management		Sec Ops / response
Purpose	Maintain competitive advantage	Avoid disruption		Remediate / recover
Posture	Proactive	Proactive		Reactive
Time frame	Far	Near		Immediate
Types of intel	Estimative, general, scientific & technical	Warning & counter- intelligence		Current intelligence
Nature	Non-technical, contextual indicators, defence-in-depth approach		Technologies (IDS, SIEM etc)	
Sharing	Public/private partnerships / Cyber security hub		Automated (e.g. feeds – STIX, TAXII, IOC)	

Driven by risk-based

resource allocation

Driven by restoration /


evidence collection

Intelligence and National Security Alliance, Operational Cyber Intelligence

Driven by company strategy

Decisions


THE PREVALENCE OF CYBER INTELLIGENCE



2013

2015

Average



Edward Waltz. Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise. Artech House: Boston & London. 2003.

CYBER INTELLIGENCE: NIST CSF

	TACTICAL	OPERATIONAL	STRATEGIC
IDENTIFY	Internal	Processes	Risk
PROTECT	Vulnerabilities	Technologies	Trends
DETECT	CTI, IOC	Campaign, TTP	Adversary
RESPOND	СТІ	TTP	Reputation
RECOVER			

CYBER INTELLIGENCE: OODA

Adapted from: The AlienVault Incident Response Toolkit: Putting the OODA Loop to Work in the Real World. 2016.

- Implement remediation & verify success
- Review controls, policies & awareness training based on lessons learnt

OBSERVE

- Detect based on IOCs, behavioural monitoring, vulnerability assessments and SIEM
- Prioritise base on threat intelligence

ACT


- Determine immediate steps to respond
- Review asset information / instructions
- Document all planned tactics for remediation

DECIDE

ORIENT

- Determine scope/impact based on threat intel
- Review in context of other network activity
- Attempt attribution / intelligence gathering

CTI APPLICATION TO THE KILL CHAIN



Adapted from: Mark Seward. *Addressing the New Threat Intelligence Problems of Scale and Relevance*. Anomali/Dark Reading/UBM Webinar. 2016.

CYBER INTELLIGENCE MATURITY

NEED TO BE HERE Architecture Passive Defence Active Defence Intelligence **Offense** Legal countermeasures The planning, Systems added to the The process of Collecting data, and self-defence establishing, and Architecture to provide analysts monitoring exploiting it into actions against an reliable defence or information, and upkeep of systems for, responding to, and adversary with security in mind learning from producing Intelligence insight against threats without consistent adversaries internal human interaction to the network

Lee, R.M. The Sliding Scale of Cyber Security. SANS Institute. 2015.

CYBER INTELLIGENCE MATURITY

Security Operations Maturity Model (HP Enterprise, 2015)

0: Incomplete	Non-existent operational elements
1: Performed	Meet minimum compliance requirements for security monitoring
2: Managed	Repeatable operational tasks, meeting business goals
3: Defined	Well-defined, subjectively evaluated, and flexible operations
4: Measured	Operations are quantitatively evaluated, continuous review & improved
5: Optimizing	Implemented operational improvement program tracking deficiencies and lessons learnt drive improvement

Security Intelligence Maturity Model (LogRhythm, 2015)

0: Blind 1: Minimo		3: Vigilant	4: Resilient
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- Capability, organizational characteristics, risk characteristics
- MTTD / MTTR

- Cyber Intelligence is clearly critical to Information Security governance, risk and assurance in order to address exponentially increasing threats: Kaspersky, Merrill Lynch
 - ✓ In 1994, a new threat was discovered each hour.
 - ✓ In 2006, a threat was discovered each minute.
 - ✓ By 2012, this had grown to a threat per second.
 - ✓ By 2014, leaped to over three per second.
 - ✓ In **2015** nearly **seven** per **second**.
 - ✓ Estimated that 70 % undetected.

Current Information Security Approaches + Cyber Threat Intelligence


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Gaining the Edge - Shaping the Future ???

- What about high-end threats in a complex environment?
- High-end threats are increasingly multi-vectored, interlinked and intelligence driven.
- What else is needed to 'Gain the Edge and Shape the Future'?
- This part of the presentation briefly examines
 - The nature of high-end threats (threat landscape).
 - Cyber-security responses in general.
 - What Cyber Counterintelligence is and why it is needed.
 - As a 'takeaway', a CCI-meta model to inform the configuration of organisational Information Security posture.

- Threat landscape

Multi-vectored intelligence (inclusive of HUMINT) is the name of the game



- Threat landscape






ProjectSauron advanced persistent threat 'ProjectSauron' is a unique 'pattern-less' threat actor responsible for highly-targeted, resource-intensive cyber-espionage attacks against government and research organizations as well as communication and financial companies. Victims have been found in the Russian Federation, Iran, and Rwanda but this is likely to represent the tip of the iceberg. © Government Military organizations See Scientific research centers Telecoms providers Financial organizations See Scientific research centers Telecoms providers Financial organizations See Scientific research centers Telecoms providers See Financial organizations See Scientific research centers Telecoms providers See Financial organizations Telecoms providers See Financial organizations See Scientific research centers See Scientific research centers Telecoms providers See Financial organizations See Scientific research centers See Sc

- Threat landscape

Conventional 'thinking-in-boxes' no longer holds.



- Threat landscape

Some recent quotes on threat actors:

- "Nonstate entities, including international terrorist groups and transnational organized crime organizations, will continue to employ and potentially improve their intelligence capabilities, which include human, cyber, and technical means ... These entities recruit human sources and conduct physical and technical surveillance to facilitate their activities and avoid detection and capture." USA Intelligence Community (2016)
- "distinguishing criminal gangs from nation-state actors (is) a challenge.... Tools and tradecraft become harder to tell apart ... some financial threat groups that we track exhibit traits that look more like state-sponsored APT activity." Mandiant FireEye (2015)
- "The primary motivation behind global cyber activity has now shifted from disparate activities carried out by individuals, groups and criminal gangs pursuing short-term financial gain, to skilled adversaries driven by broader agendas." Crowdstrike (2015)

Cybersecurity responses

Some quotes on our responses during the past three years:

- "Regardless of how much we are spending to keep the adversaries out, they are still getting in. If we continue to think of our defences in a check box, technology specific and project-based, nothing is going to change for us" HP 2013
- "Cybersecurity experts know well that the perimeter defence approach doesn't work. All such
 defences can eventually be penetrated or bypassed. And even without such breaches, systems can be
 compromised ... when bad guys are already inside the perimeter." Minister Mahlobo 2015
- "While information security risks have dramatically evolved, security strategies ... have not kept pace
 ... Most organisations are now defending yesterday, even as their adversaries look to exploit the vulnerabilities of tomorrow." PwC 2013
- "Cyber security goes to the offensive, governments, intelligence agencies, law enforcement and
 private companies" are increasingly considering "an offensive approach to defend their assets from
 cyber attacks or to assert its supremacy." Infosec 2014

WHY WE NEED CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE?

- What type of approach do we then need?
- Five key inter-related requirements
 - ✓ Defences: robust and smarter
 - ✓ Offensive: pro-active identification and engagement of adversaries
 - ✓ Intelligence at the centre.
 - ✓ Multi-vectored
 - ✓ Integrated with organisational DNA and Cyber Intelligence.



- To 'Gain the Edge Shape the Future' we have to go 'Back to the Future'.
- Counter+ intelligence = counterintelligence.
- Counterintelligence a premise for modelling aspects of our organisational approach.

WHAT IS CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE?

- Counterintelligence's three core missions:
 - Defensive: prevent, deter and detect.
 - Offensive: detect, disrupt, deceive and degrade through active engagement.
 - Intelligence: on environment, adversaries and own vulnerabilities.
- A nation-state's CI functions summarised in D⁹: Defend, Deter, Detect, Deflect, Derail, Disrupt, Deceive, Degrade and Destroy.
- Counterintelligence methods range from physical security to offensive ops.
- Since Cyber Counterintelligence is a subset of Counterintelligence it is also multivectored.


WHAT IS CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE?

'CONVENTIONAL' COUNTERINTELLIGENCE	CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Perimeter security and access control	Firewall and validation
'Fences' and CCTV	IDS and IPS Monitor and inspect traffic with complementary aims. IPS is a control tool ('fence'), IDS is a visibility tool ('CCTV').
Honeypots, dangle, agent/ double agent operations	A honeypot, honeynet and honeywall Network set up to 'invite' intrusion or transgression, so that internal and/or external attacker activities, MO and aims can be determined.
Cover and False flags	Sock puppets Online identity used for purposes of deception and collection.
All-source CI gathering platforms and services	Threat Intelligence engines/platforms Pool open, deep and dark web sources to analyse threats and trends.
HUMINT network	'Virtual' agents Penetration of certain hackers forums, closed groups, Darknet


WHAT CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IS AND IS NOT?

- Cyber Counterintelligence is not?
 - ✓ 'Hacking back' in a Cyber Wild West.
 - There are very real legal, organisational and practical limitations.
 - ✓ Plug-in / add-on service or product.
 - ✓ Always a dedicated organisational structure.
- A Cyber Counterintelligence Model provides a starting point to configure and demarcate an organisational approach.


CYBER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MODEL




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



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












- 'Theoretical' model with real practical application.
- Postures will differ.
- Ensures integration and maximise resources.
- Summarised: Bad news can be good news.

CONCLUSION

Cyber Intelligence and Counterintelligence are interlinked.

STRATEGY & INTELLIGENCE

- Cyber intelligence and counterintelligence about innovatively applying timetested practices to the cyber realm.
- Going 'Back to the Future' to 'Gain the Edge Shape the Future'
- Both relate to strategic, operational and tactical levels across the organization.
- We need to further developed cyber intelligence and counterintelligence in the South African context.
- Ongoing project at the University of Johannesburg.

http://adam.uj.ac.za/csi/CyberCounterintelligence.html



Thank you

Questions / Comments?

Petrus 'Beer' Duvenage Brett van Niekerk duvenage@live.co.za academic.relations@isaca.org.za